Reforming the bureaucracy

News reports say that the new government is looking at ways of making the official system function more effectively, by changing the rules governing bureaucrats. If this is indeed the case, it will certainly occupy the government for its full term of five years, and then some. The failures of governance are so manifestly comprehensive, and the problems in the system so manifold, that there can be neither a simple nor any easy set of solutions.

Indeed, it will take many years of concerted effort to undo the damage, just as it has taken many years of corrupting the system to reach today’s denouement—where the provision of a public service like health or education is usually done with greater efficiency and at lower cost by the private sector, and where the government is happy to outsource more and more of its work (including the provision of security at government offices!) so long as those government servants whose work is outsourced are not sent packing, and continue to draw their pay and perquisites.

The issues are many: the absence of an effective reward-punishment system; a skewed salary structure which pays too much at the bottom of the pyramid and too little at the top; the politicisation of the system and the browbeating of independent-minded bureaucrats through the pernicious practice of ad hoc transfers; the absence of domain knowledge at decision-making levels because of the absence of specialisation; the lack of early exit options and the absence of a system of lateral entry, so that the system looks less like a cradle to grave option; the inadequate opportunities for mid-career training and skill upgrading; and so on.

At least some of the reward-punishment and domain knowledge issues have been addressed recently by the Surinder Nath committee, whose report has been gathering dust for the last year. The committee, headed by a former UPSC chairman, recommended that, as opposed to the current situation where the annual confidential report (ACR) is not shown to an officer unless it has adverse comments, the ACR must be shown to the officer and he/she given an opportunity to record his/her comments—indeed, a “referral board” is to be constituted to ensure neutrality.

Also, unlike the current ACR, which is very general in nature, all grading has to be done in relation to a pre-identified work plan for the officer—this is akin to the corporate practice of having Key Result Areas (KRAs) identified at the beginning of the year and an evaluation done against these KRAs.

While norms are to be laid down for the screening of deadwood (an officer who hasn’t made the grade for promotion on three occasions, for instance), a system of domain expertise is suggested for introduction. All jobs are divided into 11 categories—agriculture, social sectors, energy and environment, and so on. For an officer to qualify at the level of joint secretary, based on his/her qualifications, the UPSC will assign him/her one to three domains (this will be based on educational background, experience, professional courses attended, and so on).

Then the Nath committee proposes even more radical changes. Any job falling vacant will be posted on the website of the department of personnel and training (DoPT), and people will be free to apply. Based on the domain lists and ACRs, the DoPT will forward a list to the ministry concerned.

While the ministry is free to reject this list today, under the new scheme the ministry will have to explain why to the home minister and the Prime Minister, which should serve as a check against ministers playing favourites. These are not complete solutions, but they do provide a starting point.